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In  recent  years  the  media  have  been  persistently  talking  about  the  possibility  of 
conflicts, even wars, sparked by regional or international disputes over the control of 
and access to water. This renewable, but scarce, natural resource has been under intense 
pressure as demand increases  At the same time, the eco-systems that produce fresh 
water have been altered or destroyed,  while surface and groundwater have suffered 
severe  ecological  damage  from  pollution  caused  by  urban  systems  and  commercial 
agriculture. 
 
Growing demand, both present and projected, has evidenced  regional and international 
conflicts  in  which  those  involved  seek  to  ensure  access  to  water,  following    the 
perspectives determined by cyclical shortages attributable to droughts. The backdrop is 
formed by the naturally limited availability of water in the arid regions of the world 
(Cortez, Whiteford and Chávez, 2005). 
 
Mexico is no stranger to such conflicts, since arid conditions that limit water availability 
are present on  two thirds of the nation's territory. At the same time, most of the surface 
water available in the basins (the Rio Grande -- Rio Bravo in Spanish -- the Colorado 
river and Tijuana) located in states near the US border is distributed in accordance with 
a legal framework agreed between the two countries in the 1906 Convention and the 
1944 Treaty.  
 
So far these international treaties between the two countries have led to accords and 
reasonable  solutions  in  moments  of  crisis  with  a    potential  for  conflict,  though 
controversy is sure to persist, as are  their fairness and justice.  
 
This paper focuses on the paving of the All-American Canal (AAC) in California, right 
on the border with Mexico and near the city of Mexicali. This is one of the most recent 
and  serious water conflicts between the two countries. In a  sense, it amounts to a 
conflict that resembles the bilateral relationship in that it gets to the heart of competition 
to ensure a portion of water of a very high value in a regional context.  Paradoxically 
this  occurs  in  a  parallel  fashion  to  major  advances  in  binational  cooperation  on 
environmental issues. 
 
From our point of view, the manner in which the conflict over the lining of the AAC  
has been approached, has major repercussions for the future of water management along  
the border between Mexico and the United States since it marks  the beginning of a 
tendency in the resolution of controversies that arises as a result of sharing the water of 




The AAC began operations in 1940 as part of a decision  by the US government  to gain 
full control of the water  infrastructure that supplies  the Imperial Irrigation District, the 
largest in the US. Before the AAC was built, the water flowed through  the Alamo 
Canal as it followed the natural slope to the  Imperial Valley. Attempts to divert the 
flow to the US side were hindered by a large area of sand dunes, while efforts by private 
companies to open feeder canals proved extremely costly.    3 
 
Washington's decision illustrates the vision of national security that has been present 
since the beginning of the last century when problems emerged due to floods of  the 
canals, but it gained strength in the 1930s as a  reaction to Mexican nationalism and the 
agrarian movement that led the Mexican government to expropriate land throughout the 
country . 
 
The AAC transports water to the Imperial Irrigation District, extending 137 kilometres 
(85 miles) along the Mexican border. As a result, part of the water that carries seeps 
through the subsoil following the natural downward slope to feed the Mexicali aquifer 
on the Mexican side of the border, representing a major source of water for the farmers. 
This was highlighted during the 1960s by the salinity crisis that affected land in the 
Mexicali  Valley  (Mumme,  2004).  It  appears  that  it  was  at  this  time  that    the  idea 
emerged of recovering the water that filtered through the sandy soil in the United States. 
Matters made headlines  in the 1980s, when southern California increased  the pressure 
for water conservation in response to the Department of the Interior request to  use only 
its share of the Colorado water while stopping the utilization of those resources  that 
belonged to Arizona and Nevada.  
 
In effect, it was during the 1980s that proposals to line the All-American Canal first 
appeared  as a means of halting the seepage. The Mexican government, through the US-
Mexico International Boundary and Water Commission (IBWC), responded by seeking 
negotiations on the issue on the grounds that  Mexico had established a beneficial use of 
the water that gave it user rights. The upstream users disagreed and, through the US 
Bureau of Reclamation, proposed options to claim the water in question  (Mumme, 
2004). In 1988, the US Congress passed Bill 100-675, which authorised the Secretary of 
the Interior to order the necessary works for the lining of the All-American Canal in the 
Imperial Valley (Castro, 2004). More recently,  an environmental impact study required 
by US law recommended the construction of a second, 37 kilometre (23 miles) cement-
lined canal to run parallel to the AAC, authorizing  83.5 cubic metres (2,950 cubic feet) 
of water.  
 
The  urgency  of  the  measure  derives  from  the  deadline  that  the  Department  of  the 
Interior set for the state of California. By 2010, the state has to reduce its dependence on 
water from the Colorado river, using no more than its annual share of 54.3 billion cubic 
metres (4.4 million acre-feet). As a result, California will have to impose water-saving 
measures  in order to reduce consumption by 1.5 billion cubic metres (1.22 million acre-
feet). 
 
Position of the Mexican Government 
 
The US decision to pave the AAC  to  recover the water that seeps through its sandy 
subsoil is based on the supposition that the water is US property, and corresponds to 
California's share from the Colorado; the AAC  is in US territory and Washington has 
taken a sovereign decision to line  it with the aim to  make  more water available. 
 
For its part, the Mexican government bases its case on the principle that the Mexicali 
Valley farmers  have established a beneficial use of the water in dispute, so giving them 
rights to it under international law. At the same time, the Mexican government invokes 
the text of Resolution 242 of the IBWC  that solved the salinity crisis in the Mexicali   4 
Valley. The resolution, as a means of avoiding problems in the future, obliges the two 
governments  to  consult  each  other  before  undertaking  any  future  project  involving 
surface or groundwater that could adversely affect the other country.  
 
In the specific case of the AAC , the Mexican government argues that there has been no 
consultation,  while  Washington  insists  that  it  notified  Mexico  of  its  intention  to 
undertake the project. In this sense, what looks like a semantic problem is simply  a way 
of  covering  up  the  unilateral  nature  of  the  decision,  and  the  failure  to  consider  its 
potential impact  south of the border. 
 
Although the US decision to pave the AAC  was informed  to our country in 1976, the 
Mexican government maintained an attitude of caution while rejecting the measure. The 
Mexican Senate, however, has been more active in its reaction. The Senators for Baja 
California have played a key role in drawing the Foreign Ministry's attention  to take a 
firm stance in its dealings with the US government in relation to this issue (Sánchez, 
2004). 
 
Thanks  to  the  Mexican  government's  low  profile,  some  negotiations  got  under  way 
though    the  IBWC,  with    the  Mexican  side  taking  a  realistic  attitude  based  on  its 
conclusion that the US decision was irreversible, despite the possibility to introduce 
bargaining chips that would soften the impact, if only partially. The discussion  began to 
centre on the quality of water that Mexico receives in the area and the use of the AAC  
to take water to another point within Mexico, thus allowing it to continue to feed the 
Mexicali aquifer a measure that would reduce the flow and the impact on the affected 
zone. Another issue introduced was the generation of electricity by Mexico, using the 
canal in a way similar to that used by the United States for some time . 
 
From  2000  the  talks  have  been  deadlocked,  due  mainly  to  the  expectations  of  the 
Federal  administration that took over in Mexico on the assumption that the democratic 
legitimacy gained when taking  power gave it a greater advantage than its predecessors 
in establishing the bases for negotiation on  issues from  the bilateral agenda. The issue 
of the lining  of the AAC  was taken out of the ambit of the IBWC and raised to the 
highest  diplomatic  level,  with  the  aim  of  direct  negotiations  between  the  Foreign 
Ministry and the US Department of State. At the same time, it was never a priority for 
the Mexican government, for whom migration has been the main issue in the bilateral 
agenda. The appearance of the AAC on that agenda was the result of pressure brought 
by Texas on Mexico to pay its historic water debt in the Rio Grande basin. That gave 
Mexico  the  opportunity  to  bring  the  AAC  into  the  debate  at  the  North  American 
security meeting held in Waco, Texas in May 2005. To date, however, no progress has 
been reported in the negotiations between the two governments at top diplomatic level. 
 
Matters  complicated  even  more  because  the  Government  of  California  has  made 
progress with internal accords to transfer the water saved by  the lining project. There  
are now agreements with the Imperial Irrigation District for the lining of canals, in 
exchange for a contract -- which has already been signed -- to transfer the water  saved 
to the urban areas of southern California over  the next 110 years. In other words, more 
players are now involved, complicating more the possibility  of a solution  favourable to 
Mexico. 
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Impact on Mexico of the lining  of the AAC 
 
The rejection by  the Mexican government of the plan to line  the AAC  is not only 
based on the legal principles established by  the 1944 Water Treaty on the distribution 
and management of the water of the cross-border basins shared by  the two countries . 
Evidence  from studies on the likely effects  to  the Mexican side point clearly to four 
types of impacts: the availability of groundwater in an agricultural zone next to the 
border; water quality in the region; the natural environment of the Mexicali Valley and 
the Colorado Delta; and the economy of an important group of farmers in Mexicali, 
some of them under the land ownership known as  the ejido system (the collective units 
of land ownership that emerged from the Mexican Revolution at the beginning of the 
last century). 
 
On the question of water availability, it is pretty obvious that the lining of the canal, or 
the construction of a new lined canal, will halt the seepage of water to the subsoil that 
existed  since the construction of the original AAC. It is not, however, the only source 
that feeds the aquifer: the  Colorado River supplies it by means of a dynamic network of 
underground flows. Estimates  of the water that would be lost by the lining of the AAC 
run to 80 million cubic metres (approximately 65,000 AF)  a year. 
 
The water that seeps from the AAC  into the aquifer is, on the other hand, regarded of 
high-quality in terms of total dissolved solids, PH and electrical conductivity (Herrera et 
al, 2004). At the same time, given the concentration of soluble salts in the waters of the 
Colorado  that  are  deposited  in  the  soil  of  the  Mexicali  Valley,  any  of  the  two 
alternatives mentioned do not only imply a loss in water volume as a result of less 
seepage. It also means a higher concentration of soluble salts in the water that remains 
available due to  a drop in the volume required to dilute them. In turn, that will affect 
the various crops grown in the area, where irrigation is based on  groundwater deposits 
fed by the AAC  (García et al, 2004). 
 
The likely impact has not been established in economic terms, though it is important to 
note that the land irrigated by pumped groundwater is assigned to commercial crops that 
are highly profitable both on domestic and foreign markets. 
 
Information on the extent of the area irrigated by  groundwater associated with seepage 
from the AAC is inaccurate, or rather contradictory, since the information varies in 
accordance to  whomever provides it. Published articles by Douglas Hayes and Jesús 
Román point to an area of 13,500 hectares, while Julio Navarro speaks of 19,200. The 
IBWC  refers  to  1,200  hectares  while  Senators  Corella  and  Alvarez  mention  9,200 
hectares (Sánchez, 2004). At the same time, the authorities refer to the effects that the 
lining of the AAC will have on  the families of some 1,200 farmers .  
 
One of the most noteworthy aspects of the project has to do with its likely impact on the 
environment.  The  environmental  impact  study  ordered  by  the  US  Bureau  of 
Reclamation was developed with reference only to the US border; no consideration at 
all was given to the Mexican side as likely to be affected. So far the only study made to 
estimate the environmental impacts of the project on the Mexican side was carried out 
by the Sonoran Institute and the NGO PRONATURA, at the request the Department of 
Ecology of the Government of Baja California. The results indicate that the loss of 
water would have a negative impact on an important system of wetlands, the riparian   6 
vegetation of the Colorado below the Parker Dam and, indirectly on a number of animal 
species,  mainly  migratory  birds  that  use  these  areas  as  way-stations.  Some  of  the 
region's endemic species are catalogued by both countries as having special protection 
status, at federal level and in the legislation of the state of California. It is important to 
note, too, that the surface area which ecology is deemed likely to be damaged according 
to the Bureau of Reclamation study represents only a third of what will be negatively 
affected on the Mexican side (Sonoran Institute/PRONATURA, 2005).  
 
Binational Cooperation on the Environment of the Region 
 
All that has been said about the project to line  the AAC seems paradoxical when we 
consider  the  cooperation  on  environmental  issues  that  has  built  up  in  recent  years 
between the two nations in dispute over the canal. As a result of the environmental 
institutions that emerged from the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA), 
society  at  large  and  the  governments  of  both  countries  found  common  ground  in 
cooperation aimed at conservation, the protection of species, and the need to clean up 
the  border  in  terms  of  the  development  of  sanitary  infrastructure  and  wastewater 
treatment. 
 
Various agreements were reached within the IBWC  on cooperation to solve  different  
aspects related to the river basins included in the 1944 Water Treaty. On the Colorado 
River  for  example,  Resolutions  241  and  142  set  the  basis    for  solving  the  salinity 
problem that affected the Mexicali Valley in the 1960s and until 1973. Resolutions 264 
and 288 established commitments on the development of programs aimed at cleaning up 
the border, basically  with regard to the New River that  runs from Mexicali to the 
United States through the Imperial Valley region. Resolution 291 sets commitments to 
deal with the problem of sedimentary deposits on the Colorado River bed, which also 
affected the urban distribution network and the irrigated zone of the Mexicali Valley 
during  the  floods  of  1993.  In  more  recent  times  Resolution  306  in  2000  set  initial 
commitments for the development of studies that will lead to recommendations on the 
environmental  conservation  of  the  riparian  ecology  and  the  estuary  formed  by  the 
Colorado and its delta. Resolution 311 of February 2005 established a commitment to 
construct  a  wastewater  treatment  plant  in  Tijuana  that  will  facilitate  the  advanced 
secondary treatment that the city's current International Wastewater Treatment Plant has 
been unable to achieve. The project and its operation during 20 years are to be financed 
with funds provided by the US government . 
 
This phase of binational cooperation, however, is notable for the absence of an overall 
vision of water-related problems and for the lack of coherence in defining the region's 
environmental problems, all of which translates into policies and projects that have no 




The decision by the United States to pave the AAC  provides us with some lessons that 
will have to be taken into account in the future. The first is that the conflict clearly 
indicates the absence of a binational accord on the groundwater located in the border 
aquifers, and the urgency of setting up negotiations to establish one. An accord would 
not in itself avert the conflict, but at least it would set up an institutional framework 
capable of resolving any controversies that might arise in the future. At the same time, it   7 
is important to highlight the low profile that the Mexican government has maintained on 
the issue and the absence of information provided to those most directly involved, be 
they farmers, local governments or the Mexican Senate itself. 
  
The Mexican government has been unable to identify opportunities, and has lacked any 
strategy  to  win  allies  within  the  United  States,  mainly  those  communities  with  the 
sensitivity  to  environmental  issues.  The  current  government  of  Baja  California  has 
shown the most interest in generating information for the community. In  recent months 
the business leaders of the Mexicali Economic Development Committee have become 
actively involved,  all of which shows the lack of knowledge and the foot-dragging on 
the  issue  in  Mexico,  within  both  the  government  and  society  at  large.  Widespread 
ignorance  continues  to  prevail  in  Mexico  about  the  ways  water  management  are 
organized and operated in the United States, with no knowledge of the role that the 
states  or  the interest groups involved play in water policy. Finally, it is quite clear that, 
amid  efforts  to  secure  control  over  water  in  areas  of  relative  scarcity  such  as  the 
borderlands  between  Mexico  and  the  United  States,  any  other  interest  is  of  not 
importance to the party that takes the initiative and decides to make the water its own. 
The  quest  for,  and  perseverance  on,  binational  cooperation  as  a  feasible  and  more 
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